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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK:
SOME FEATURES OF ITS ORGANIZATION
AND WORK
FRANK

H. HIscocK*

As I become sufficiently separated from my membership in the
Court of Appeals so that I can look back at its organization and
work in quite an impersonal and impartial way, I see certain features
which in my opinion have especially contributed to its efficiency and
reputation and some of which have been due to outside and even
accidental causes.
At this distance we are not apt to appreciate how fortunate the
State was in the characer of the men -who were selected as the
first members of the Court when its present oganization became
effective in 1870. While the organization of the Court prior to that
time -had in many respects been cumbersome, illogical and unsatisfactory, nevertheless it had brought into service judges who almost
uniformly were of excellent ability and who sometimes were conspicuously learned and able. The names of Denio, Comstock,
Selden, Paige and Bronson amongst otghe-s who had sat in the
former Court of Appeals were still fresh in the minds at least of
the Bar as those of great judges and if the first judges selected for
the reorganized Court had been men of mediocre ability or of anything less than high character, the new Court and its standards
would have received a blow and a precedent have been set from
which recovery would have been slow. As a matter of fact there
was no basis for great optimism about the character of the men who
would be selected. The political party which was in the majority at
,that time was largely under the control of unfortunate influences
and there was no reason to feel sure that these influences would not
find some expression in the -character of the men who were nominated for the new judgeships. Very fortunately, however, the result
of the selections was far beyond what might have been reasonably
anticipated. One has only to recall the names of the judges who
were selected-Church, Allen, Peckham, Grover, Folger, Rapallo and
*Associate Judge. New York Court of Appeals. 19o6-i917. Chief Judge. New
York Court of Appeals, 1917-1927.
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Andrews-to appreciate that in average or aggregate ability of its
members that membership of the Court has never been excelled
and by this first composition, standards for membership in the Court
were fixed from 'vhich it was difficult for political parties to escape.
In fact, I can remember only one instance in which there has been
nominated by one of the great parties for a Court of Appeals judgeship as a-man whose character was assailed as unfitting him for the
position, and it is fair to say that in this case the criticisms were
based upon an act springing out of political strife rather than upon
any personal or professional dereliction.
Of course, no one would assume that the substantial degree of
immunity which the Court of Appeals has enjoyed from such wide
spread storms of criticism, vituperation and distrust as so frequently
enveloped the Supreme Court of the United States in its earlier
days has been wholly due to the fact that these first Judges and
their early successors tended by their high character and ability, to
create for the Court a firm and lasting popular confidepnce. These
qualities were also possessed by Chief Justices Marshall, Taney
and Chase who were particular subjects of attack. The fact that
our Judges are selected by election rather than appointment has
undoubtedly strengthened them against the possibility of those
popular attacks which so often threatened the reputation and usefulness of the Supreme Court in its early history. Then too the Court
of Appeals has seldom been called on to decide cases involvifng
questions of large political policy or consequence, such as so often
came to the Supreme Court in early days. But, on the other hand it
has constantly been required to decide cases involving tremendous
property interests and acute issues of an economic and social nature
where under favoring conditions it would have been quite easy for
the unreasonable, unthinking and demagogic assailagt to stir up
unfair criticism, abuse and distrust and no one can doubt that the
membership of such men as Chief Judges .Church, Folger, Andrews
and Ruger and their associates in the early days were: potent in
establishing for the Court at the beginning a popular confidence
which lasted and made such attacks unpromising.
In more 'recent years the selection of Judges of the Court in my
opinion has been benefited by a constitutional provision which was
designed for an entirely different purpose, and by the practice under
which we have secured the advantages of both the appointive and
elective system in selecting judges. By an amendment of the Constitution adopted in 1899 it was provided that: "Whenever and as
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often as the Court of Appeals shall certify to the Governor that the
court is unable, 'by reason of the accumulation of causes pending
therein, to hear and dispose of the same with reasonable speed, the
Governor shall designate such number of justices of the Supreme
Court as may be so certified to be necessary, but not more than four,
to serve as associate judges of the Court of Appeals." Of course,
the purpose of this provision as is indicated on its face was to enable
the Court of Appeals to dispose of a gradually accumulating number
of appeals. Other methods had been tried by which to accomplish
this purpose and still more proposed with a fortunate rejection
before trial. In the first days of the Court under its present organization we had had a Commission of Appeals and still later commencing in the late eighties we had had a second division of the Court,
both aiming to keep up with business when.the Court with its regular
membership had been unable so to do. Both of these methods'had
proved more or less undesirable, sometimes resulting in absolutely
conflicting decisions and frequently resulting, in a more or less unfortunate maneuvering by counsel to get before one tribunal 'or the
other as liable to be more sympathetic with the requirements of his
case. Thus it was that the provision which I have quoted was adopted as a better means of accormplishing a desired result and I have no
doubt that it was a much better method than a second division of the
court because, especially where the Chief Judge sat practically all of
the time, it was possible to preserve a consistency, and harmony in
the decisions of the court which it had been proved was not possible
where there were separate organizations. In questions of mere
practice it often is not of any particular importancel which way the
question is decided but it is important that there 'should be uniform
decisions so that counsel may know. how to guide their steps.
But the interesting fact 'to which I wish to refer- is that this provision not only worked fairly well in accomplishing the purpose for
which it was designed 'but it accomplished other things which were of
great benefit to the Court. As I have said, it indirectly resultefd in
the application of both the appointive and elective systems in the
selection of judges of the Court of Appeals. The original assignment of a Supreme Court justice to the Court was made by the
Governor who was uniformly influenced by the advice of members
of the Bar and by public opinion to select some justice who had done
satisfactory work in the Supreme Court and who, therefore, might
be expected with experience to become a useful member of the Court
of Appeals. In this "'waythe benefits of an appointive system were
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secured. Then when a vacancy occurred in the regular membership
of the Court political parties were quite apt, in making their nominations, to consider the judges who had had the experience of sitting in
the Court by assignment and to select them for permanent positions
if their services had been acceptable, thus preserving the benefits
and checks of the elective system. That this practice was quite
universally followed is evident from the fact that when Judge
McLaughlin and I retired from the Court in December, 1926, all but
two of the members of the Court had originally served as auxiliary
judges by assignment and the other two members, although coming
into it by election as regular members instead of by original assignment, had been :Supreme Court Justices so that there was the quite
remarkable situation that all seven members of the Court had originally been Supreme Court justices and had done more or less trial
work as well as in most cases appellate work ,in that Court.
It undoubtedly is a matter of much advantage and benefit to an
appellate judge that he should have had some service as a trial judge.
If no other benefit resulted, and others certainly do result, it would
be a helpful 'check on an. appellate judge reviewing the work of a
txial judge to be reminded by his own experience that the latter
often has to decide perplexing questions on the minute without
examination and that frequently errors which he may commit do
not exercise the slightest influence on the result of a trial. It is
easy for an appellate judge who has never had any experience in
trial work, reviewing a case in the. calm and unhurried deliberation
of his chambers or of a consultation room, to become impatient
with some evident trial error and declare for reversal. Occasionally
these errors are pretty bad and make one somewhat discouraged
with the capacity of the judge who made them. But many can be
excused and, in these days, when the stress is so strong in favor of
disregarding errors of a technical nature (a pretty indefinite term),
be overlooked. There is no doubt that life in an appellate court
does tend to separate a judge from contact with many if not most
kinds of activity and does tend, if he be not careful, to make of him
something of a theorist and metaphysician. Appellate judges who
are wise sufficiently resist this tendency so that they do not by any
means so cease to be "human" as is the frequent accusation. But
certainly there is no doubt that one antidote to any such disposition
in appellate work is futlnished by experience with and observation of
human nature and practical considerations in the administration of
justice which a judge. has in trial work. The popular belief that a
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certain amount of such work is needed to prevent an appellate judge
from becoming a little theoretical and impractical in his work was
abundantly evidenced by the long struggle which the Supreme Court,
overburdened with appellate work, was obliged to carry on with
Congress before it was able to secure relief for its members from
the circuit work which the latter body considered quite essential to
the wisdom and proper attitude of the Court towards questions coming before it. It was argued as an objection by senators opposing this
much needed relief that the exernptlon from this class of work would
result in members of the Court "not mingling with the ordinary
transactions of business

.

.

..

not seeing the rules of evidence

applied to the cases before -them" and "becoming philosophical and
speculative in their inquiries as to law."
Of all judges, now dead, with whom I sat during my twentyone years of membership in the Court, Chief Judge Cullen was the
outstanding figure. It was a great experience to sit under him for
eight years. There is no need to dwell at any length on his splendid
character as a man, citizen and soldier and his great learning and
ability as a lawyer and judge. His opinions, spread through so
many volumes of reports, are convincing evidence of the latter
qualities. But they are not the complete evidence of it. No one
can fully appreciate the learning, ability and contributions to our
jurisprudence of such a man as he was without having sat in consultation with him. A prevailing opinion is the deliberate and carefully considered expression of the views which have been adopted by
the court and upon which the judge, writing it, spends thoughtful
and sometimes prolonged labor and in which he may display ability
and learning. But, nevertheless, the views which are there expressed
have been formulated in a consultation where there may have been
sharp differences and much discussion resulting finally in a unanimous
or divided decision. It was in these consultations that Judge Cullen
displayed a great readiness and accuracy in analyzing questions
under discussion and a great ability, learning and good judgment
in bringing them to a conclusion, qualities which could not be fully
reflected in a later opinion. He combined to a remarkabfe degree a
memory of cases and an acquaintance with the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence-by no means an universal combination.
I have often debated with myself the interesting question whether
if he had remained in the Court, Judge Cullen would have been able
or willing to adopt the more liberal interpretation of the Constitution which has been followed during recent years by the Court to
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the end of upholding the validity of legislation adopted for the
avowed purpose, especially, of bettering industrial and social conditions. No one can doubt that he was broad-minded, liberal and
progressive in carrying out the spirit of remedial legislation where
no Constitutional obstacle arose. No better evidence of this
could be found than the opinion written by him in the case of
Fitzwater v. Warren,i in 'accordance with which the Court
held that an employer would not be allowed to defeat the aim
of legislation requiring certain dangerous machinery to be
protected, by invoking the defense of assumed risks against
an employee who had been injured by the failure so to do, and
by which decision the Court quite directly overruled prior ones.
But the former Chief Judge had such convictions on the interpretation of the Constitution and was so sternly opposed to too great
interference with personal rights for the avowed purpose of accomplishing community welfare that I doubt very much whether he
would have been willing to accept as constitutional some, of the
legislation which has been upheld in recent years. He not only concurred in the opinion written by Judge Werner condemning the first
Workmen's Compensation Act as invalid2 but in addition wrote a
vigorously concurring opinion, and in both of these there was
denial of the theory now so commonly accepted that injury to a
workman in the course of his work may be Tegarded as an incident
and burden of the industry in which he is engaged and compensation
enforced against the employer even though the latter has been guilty
of no negligence. With the views which he there displayed he probably would never have been willing to give to the Constitution that
liberal interpretation which has resulted in upholding the validity
of many laws passed in the exercise of police power, which were
regarded as reaching their climax in the enactment of the so-called
Rent Laws adopted a few years since. Undoubtedly, very many
lawyers and laymen would have sympathized with his opposition
I
to some of these laws.
As everyone knows who was at all acquainted with him, Chief
judge Cullen was not only stalwart of body, until in later years
physical infirmities overtook him, but he was stalwart and confident
of mind and not afraid to take responsibilities. The result of these
latter qualifications was that he would occasionally dispose of some
12o6 N. Y. 355, 99 N. E. 1o42 (1912).
2Ives v. South Buffalo R.R., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (I911).
Upheld in Block v. Hirsh, 265 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921); People ex.
rel Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 23o N. Y. 429, 130 N. . 6oi (1921).
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question in connection with the organization or work of the Court
without those consultations with his associates, which have become
a uniform order under his successors, and give to the members of
the Court a real surprise. But these were always so satisfied with
his judgment and had so much affection for him that they never
resented this. I recollect well two of these occasions.
In 1913 the Court was utilizing the services of auxiliary judges
in the attempt' to dispose of its work and catch up with its calendar.
One of these positions had become vacant and, as was his duty, the
Chief Judge had set out to find some man to fill the position. He
settled upon Justice Nathan L. Miller, then a member of the First
Appellate Division, and he was so sure of the correctness of his
selection, that he did not deem it necessary to consult with his associates and the first we knew of what was going on was when he
aftnounced that Judge Miller was to be one of our associates and
we were asked to sign the proper papers effecting his designation.
Of course, Judge Miller's personality, reputation, ability and qualifications for the position were so fine and unquestioned that no one
in the Court of Appeals felt that it was necessary that he should
have been consulted in the selection. But I have been told that
Judge Ingraham, who was then Presiding Justice of the First
Appellate Division and who was quite as ignorant until the very end
of what was transpiring as were we, did insist that grand larcency
could be committed in respect of other things than ordinary personal property.
The other occasion arose in connection with the Sulzer Impeachment Trial. It had been a subject of considerable debate ivhether
the auxiliary judges, then sitting in the Court, of Appeals, were
such members of it as would be entitled to sit in the Impeachment
Court under the Constitution. Having this in mind I, then being
one of these judges, traveled in a somewhat leisurely way from Syracuse to Albany on the day the Court was to open its session, supposing that this question would be submitted to the full Court of
Impeachment before the auxiliary judges took their seats, if indeed
the decision should be in favor of their so doing. But this was not
what happened. The Chief Judge had concluded that these Judges
were members-of the Court for all purposes and that no discussion
was necessary and so when I reached Albany I found an attendant
and a cab waiting to hurry me to the Capitol so that I would be in
time to take my seat when the Impeachment Court convened.
When I reached the consultation room and found the judges as-
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sembled, I explained to the Chief Judge that I had not hurried for
the reasons which I have stated, but his only reply was to put on
my gown and proceed with the other judges to take my seat in the
Court, and that was the end of debate or question on the subject.
The manner in which the Impeachment Court accepted without
question the opinion of the Chief Judge on this question was only
symptomatic of the confidence and respect with which not only the
Court but the intelligent public at all times regarded his rulings as
Presiding Officer throughout this long and historic trial which
involved so much personal and political bitterness.
Two features of the methods employed by the Court in taking
appeals and receiving arguments are, I think, very fortunate. As
is generally known, cases are taken by judges in that Court by rotation, and after a long experience I feel very strongly that this is a
better method than that of assignment of cases-by the Chief Judge,
such as is practiced in many other courts including the Supreme
Court of the United States. No one need think that a judge of an
appellate court does not continue to be human enough to appreciate
the difference between a case with a voluminous record, complicated
facts and questions of no particular or general interest and a case
on the other hand which does involve interesting questions of general
importance. While he does his duty and takes whatever comes to
him he finds one case interesting and an intellectual pleasure and the
other one a piece of drudgery. It is difficult to imagine a Chief
Judge endowed with such tact and ,wisdom that in the assignment
of cases he would not occasionally make some associate judge feel
disappointed that he received some unattractive case and did not
receive some more interesting one.: In addition it seems to me that
the process of assignment might easily result in the development of
specialists which is the last thing that is desirable in an appellate
court where a case ought to receive the independent consideration
and judgment of every member. For instance, it would seem that if
a case came before the Court involving questions of irrigation, patent
rights, taxation or land titles, it would be quite natural for a Chief
Judge to fsend it to some member of the Court who had special
experience in cases dealing with those particular questions, and
that it would be equally natural for other judges, unconsciously, to
think they might safely rely on the judgment of one who had
become a specialist in that class of cases and thus fail to exercise
that independent judgment which litigants are entitled to expect
from every member of an appellate court.

-
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In the consideration of appeals, the Court !of Appeals during my
time has always been sympathetic to oral arguments. The time
which its rules have allowed for such arguments has been liberal
and there never has been any disposition to curtail these arguments
so long as counsel kept within the limits of the case and discussed
questions in a way \which would be helpful to the Court. Undoubtedly it must be said that considerable time is wasted in these arguments, due sometimes to lack of preparation for them and at other
times to failure of counsel to present their arguments in a manner
which will enable the Court to comprehend them .fully. This latter
feature in my opinion is oftentimes due to the fact that a counsel
who is thoroughly saturated with the facts of his case fails to appreciate that it is new to the Court and that the latter, therefore, is not
able to understand the bearing of some things which are said.
Nevertheless, I am thoroughly in favor of oral arguments which are
helpful if they do no more than intelligently advise the Court what
a case is about, what the questions are, and what the claims of counsel are in respect of those questions, leaving details to be filled out
on examination of the written brief. I can think of tothing which
would add more to the monotony of work in an appellate court than
a general custom under which counsel walked into the court room,
filed their briefs and then walked out. Life in such a court is not
very exciting at best and the prevalence of such a practice as I have
suggested certainly would not relieve the situation.
In connection with oral arguments the question has often arisen
and been debated by members of the Court as well as of the Bar
whether the custom of frequent and argumentative questions from
members of the Court during anargument is helpful. The practice
in the Court of Appeals has been rather against such course and in
that respect decidedly in contrast with the one prevailing in some
other courts. Of course, a certain amount of questioning from the
Bench is inevitable. The two Unaninous Affirmance rules in the
past undoubtedly made practice in the Court of Appeals rather
technical and complicated. It has often been difficult for counsel
to understand the extent to which the Unanimous Affirmance rule
forbidding the consideration of evidence carried the Court, and it
has been frequently necessary for the Chief Judge to interrogate
counsel for the purpose of ascertaining whether proposed questions
were arguable. Tn addition it frequently happens that a well
directed question does enable a judge to understand the force and
application of what is being said by counsel who has inadvertently
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omitted to explain some feature of his case. But as I say, the question has been considerably debated whether it is advisable to go
farther and by frequent questions engage in what is really a discussion with counsel of the merits of his case. Personally, I have
never thought that much was gained by doing this but that a large
percentage of questions of that character addressed from the Bench
are rather barren of results. If the case is being argued by an intelligent and well prepared counsel, he wil cover the questions in
his case in a much more orderly way if left alone than if interrupted
and if counsel is diffident, inefficient or ill-prepared such frequent
questions are more apt to confuse than to help his argument.
In considering some of the principal causes which have made for
efficiency and wisdom in the work of the Court, one would be
seriously incomplete if he failed to mention the thoroughness of
consultations and the spirit of harmony and friendly cooperation
which have prevailed. I can imagine no more thorough consideration than a case receives from every viewpoint as it passes from
judge to judge around the now historic consultation table of the
Court. If one judge has so focused his attention, on some particular' feature of a case that he is missing others, he is pretty surd to
have his mental vision broadened and made more perfect by his
associates, and not infrequently I have- seen a prospective decision
concurred in by five or even six judges corrected and reversed by the
argument of the final one or two judges. The minds of seven men
directed to the consideration and analysis of a proposition can
fairly be accepted as a substantial guaranty against error. We
might well abolish opinions if it was the necessary alternative to preserving consultations. Then one appreciates more than ever as he
looks back at a term of long and pleasant service in the Court how
friendly and considerate his associates have been and how much
this attitude has contributed to whatever success he nay have
attained. I again acknowledge the human element in judicial
character and freely admit that it would seem to me to be difficult
for a judge in consultation to listen with a perfectly sympathetic
and receptive mind to the views of another judge with whom he
was not on speaking terms and toward whose general attitude in
the Court he had conceived an active and personal hostility. The
desirability of an atmosphere free from personal animosities, and on
the other hand the necessity for thorough consultations and cooperative harmony in an appellate court, are so obvious that it seems
almost commonplace to dwell upon them as a source of strength
which has been especially existent in the Court of Appeals. We
have been told, however that these features are not so universal
as to be commonplace.

